

USAID/BHR
Office of Transition Initiatives

Results Review
FY 1997
and
Resources Request
FY 2000
(R4)

REFINING TRANSITION ASSISTANCE

USAID, Office of Transition Initiatives
Ronald Reagan Building, 8.06 - 073
Washington, DC 20523-8602
Tel: 202-712-1224 Fax: 202-216-3043



***U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Humanitarian Response
Office of Transition Initiatives***

FY 2000 Results Review Resources Request Report (R4): Refining Transition Assistance

-- Errata List --

[NB: This list does not correct typos, or add substantive comments. It does attempt to correct some of the data. Also note that when printed by different printers, this document sometimes develops different pagination.]

Page 4: Joint leadership can accomplish more -- change "CEO" to CEI.

Page 6: Table 1: OTI's Local Partners (1997) -- add "124 projects funded at the community level" in the cell Guatemala/Communities Funded. Add "1 indigenous NGO" to the cell Guatemala/Indigenous NGOs Funded.

Table 1 -- change cell Angola/Communities funded to "588 projects in 273 communities."

Page 7: Turn-key operations -- change to "In Bosnia and Angola, foreign service nationals manage programs and activities with little OTI oversight"

Page 10: The relationship between post-conflict transitions and criminal behavior -- add Guatemala to the list of countries experiencing increased criminal activities (last paragraph of the page).

Page 21: Indicator: Progress toward establishment of a participatory governance -- change the bullet on Angola to read "OTI-funded projects in Angola focused on participatory decision-making and empowerment at the community level. In both UNITA and MPLA controlled areas, these community-based activities have fostered collaboration on repairing and sustaining schools, roads, bridges, community buildings, and markets. Additionally, as communities established markets on the border between the two entities, and as trade and commerce grew, reconciliation has been facilitated."

Change the bullet on the Former Yugoslavia to read "OTI supported TV (11) and radio stations (27), and newspapers and news agencies (22) have been at the forefront in reporting on ..."

Page 22: Indicator: Progress towards civilian control over security -- change the last paragraph to read "... In Angola, however, attempts were made to demobilize significant numbers of fighters, but because of continued insecurity and uncertain expectations of future

stability, Angolans remain prepared to continue some degree of the armed struggle, as is evident by the large number of UNITA troops still under arms."

Page 24: Indicator: Reintegration of ex-combatants -- Change "Initially, OTI worked continuously with the UN ... OTI worked with FONAPAZ" to "Initially, OTI cooperated continuously with the UN ... OTI cooperated with FONAPAZ"

Delete "Through OTI programs, all 2,940 URNG ex-combatants and 1,722 special military police received were demobilized in eight camps ... with self-sustaining livelihoods."

Insert "Through OTI programs, 2,940 URNG ex-combatants were demobilized into eight camps and 1,100 received for vocational training and adult literacy programs. Additionally, 400 special military police received their own retraining and apprenticeship program. OTI also funded a project to provide 382 URNG ex-combatants with income generating, self-sustaining livelihood assistance."

Change "One noteworthy impact of this activity is that the overall security situation improved. For example, ..." to "One noteworthy impact of this activity is that none of the ex-combatants who have received assistance from OTI has been implicated in criminal"

Page 25: First paragraph -- change "there has been no public reaction to ex-combatants and few threats ..." to "there has been little public retaliation against ex-combatants and few threats"

Indicator: Progress toward freedom of movement and some sense of security -- to the bullet on Guatemala, add "Additionally, OTI paid for to transport some ex-combatant refugees and included other non-combatants in adult-literacy programs, provided re-settlement allowances to non-combatants, and more. All of which helped to increase the sense of security in communities around Guatemala."

Page 26: Indicator: Reintegration of ex-combatants -- change the paragraph starting with "Reintegration and demobilization activities ... In Angola, where OTI was involved ..." to ".... In Angola, where OTI was involved in civic training and demobilization activities for ex-combatants, 10,000 ex-combatants actually demobilized and received civic training. However, the desertion rate was around 50%, as ex-combatants left to return to their families, grew frustrated with the protracted demobilization process, or departed for a variety of other personal or economic reasons."

Page 26: Indicator: Number of returned IDPs/refugees to their communities -- change the bullet on Guatemala to "OTI funded the voluntary return of all two hundred and eighteen rebel ex-combatants who wished to return to Guatemala as part of the demobilization project."

Page 27: Indicator: Progress toward political and economic power sharing -- change the last paragraph to read "OTI activities in Guatemala have not yet resulted in any discernable"

In the bullet dealing with Angola, change the sentence to "Most of the projects chosen by these communities have focused on the rehabilitation of schools, roads, bridges, markets, and other public infrastructure, and on various agricultural and micro-enterprise activities."

Page 30: Indicator: Progress toward freedom of speech and alternative voices -- change the bullet on Angola to "In April 1997, station management of independent FM Radio 2000 in Angola was told by a local Ministry of Information official that they were specifically prohibited from rebroadcasting the daily half hour VOA special program of VOA's Portuguese to Africa service. Radio 2000 was , at the time, the only FM station inside Angola carrying this programming -- believed by many Angolans to be the most informative and unbiased source of information available in Angola. This could indicate that the GOA believed that Radio 2000 was having a positive impact on informing Angolans about their political situation. Radio 2000 -- and seven other local FM stations -- are still rebroadcasting segments of the VOA program on their FM bands.

Page 31: Table 6: Summary of IR-3 -- change cell Rwanda/vulnerable and/or special groups from "Minimal focus" to "Yes."

PART 1: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE

A) OVERVIEW:

Foreign Policy Mission --

The mission of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is to contribute to U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting people and organizations in transitional countries in their efforts to achieve enduring economic, social, and political progress and to participate more fully in resolving the problems of their communities and the world in a peaceful and democratic manner. OTI pursues this mission by providing the U.S. government with an important policy tool that directly links relief activities to development programs during the "tenuous interlude between war and peace," through political reconstruction (or construction) activities. This is done by addressing the fundamental needs of emergency rehabilitation and democratic development in conflict-prone countries.

OTI is designed to be a lean, flexible operation capable of targeting the key political and operational bottlenecks that keep post-crisis societies from moving forward. The U.S. Government wants an operation that is capable of identifying and acting upon the near-term interventions that provide the momentum for a process of peace and reconciliation. In April of 1997, USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood declared that OTI is executing its mission, that OTI "is a vital tool of American foreign policy."

Indeed, in FY 1997 OTI's activities have received high-level attention within the U.S. Government. After visits to OTI-funded project sites in Guatemala and the former-Yugoslavia, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright stated that "OTI highlights the need to act flexibly when a conflict ends" (October 1997). While in Arusha, First Lady Hillary Clinton's radio address to Rwandans was made possible by an OTI grantee. At the end of 1997, President Clinton noted that his administration intends to expand OTI's efforts over the next two years because of its efforts to promote peaceful democratic transitions. And throughout the year, Brian Atwood mentioned OTI's efforts to help "define a clear exit strategy for the U.S. military" in Haiti, and that OTI helps to "translate agreement[s] on paper into a living and viable peace."

Transition Policy Partnerships --

OTI also plays an increasingly important role in providing information and assistance to the National Security Council and has improved its coordination with the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other U.S. government agencies. OTI's field-based information and field-focused analysis plays an important role in fine-tuning U.S. foreign policies towards conflict-prone countries and provides details about rapidly changing crisis situations. For example, OTI staff provided valuable insights about the May 1997 Sierra Leone coup, resulting in a more focused U.S. government response. OTI also instigated the development of an integrated U.S. Department of State and USAID assistance strategy. And OTI staff

share information and analysis -- mostly about media and civil society organizations -- with the Office of the Special Representative to the Former Yugoslavia on a regular basis, thus helping to ground U.S. foreign policy decisions. Perhaps the best indicator of OTI's success in forging intergovernmental collaboration is the growing demand for its services, and in 1997 the Department of State and the NSC asked OTI to assess the potential for transition assistance to several priority countries, including Northern Ireland and West Bank/Gaza.

Throughout 1997 OTI worked closely within USAID to develop coherent and appropriate strategies for transitions. OTI staff participated in developing USAID country strategies, provided information for and commented on Mission R4s, and worked with other planning units throughout the Agency. OTI expertise and experience has become institutionalized within USAID to the point where programs in the Philippines and Sri Lanka were initiated at the request of USAID Missions and Bureaus. Joint assessment teams were funded for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, West Bank/Gaza, and Serbia with participation from the Global Bureau, relevant Regional Bureaus, and other offices within BHR. And OTI is an active partner on several internal task forces and initiatives, funding advisors on the Congo Task Force, participating in the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, the Great Lakes Task Force, and the Congo Steering Committee, and working with the Democracy and Governance Center's anti-corruption efforts. Such collaborations and joint planning informs analysis, improves sequencing and cooperation, leverages funding, and enhances USAID's overall knowledge and capacities in these fragile countries.

In 1997 OTI also made significant progress identifying and working with other donors in transition countries. Donors have traditionally focused actions on either relief activities or on development activities, and have had difficulty reacting to the recent proliferation of transitions from war to peace. Recently, other governments and multilateral organizations have begun to create transition functions within their own institutions. At the suggestion of Administrator Atwood, in 1997 OTI planned and then hosted a workshop for these other donor to form an informal network of organizations working in transitions and to share USAID's four year experience in operating in transition countries. As a result of the workshop, donors agreed to improve information sharing, coordination, and to make a concerted effort to develop and then implement joint efforts in selected countries.

Donor coordination has advanced since the workshop, with USAID playing an important role in providing advice and counseling to the UN's War Torn Societies Project (WSP), based in Geneva. The WSP "aims to assist the international donor community, international organizations, NGOs and local authorities and organizations to understand and respond better to the complex challenges of post-conflict periods." WSP has developed a methodology for donor responses to post-conflict situations, based on sending neutral observers to conflict prone countries to help indigenous groups determine appropriate donor opportunities to address root causes of the conflict. Subsequently donors develop a participatory process to help resolve selected conflicts which also determines which program interventions and resource allocations are necessary to begin political and economic reconstruction. Currently, OTI funds a USAID advisor to the WSP process who shares his insights and field experience

with the UN's ongoing research on transition societies (including Somalia, Mozambique, Eritrea, and Guatemala.) Additionally, this advisor informs USAID staff about WSP's methodology and activities.

Policy Leadership in Transitions --

OTI's accumulated experience over the last four years allows it to play a lead role in sharing its knowledge with other donors and actors. Among the key lessons OTI learned during 1997:

* ***Joint leadership can accomplish more.*** Joint leadership can augment individual donor strengths, while leveraging partners and funding. For example, in Guatemala OTI worked closely with the Mission, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Organization of American States (OAS), and other key players in planning our program. OTI participates in the Special Commission for Incorporation (CEO) which is also made up of members from the Government of Guatemala, the UNDP, European Union, and OAS. The CEO is the body that is organizing and steering the demobilization process of Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) members and OTI's programs are integrated into these efforts. Through such joint leadership, OTI's ability to provide funding early in the process and act as a catalyst allowed other donors to focus on other aspects of the demobilization process, resulting in the meeting of peace treaty deadlines.

* ***Let others take the lead.*** Often, other operating units within USAID, other donors, or other actors are better positioned to direct transition activities. For example, OTI has found that the UNDP has the best capacity for coordinating transition activities in Jaffna, Sri Lanka. Likewise, the Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) project of the USAID Mission in the Philippines provides an excellent foundation for developing OTI's transition activities.

* ***Invest in others' successes.*** Sometimes other donors and/or USAID offices have initiated activities that are achieving significant and relevant results before OTI becomes actively engaged in a country. Rather than "recreating the wheel," OTI has aimed to build upon such successes in order to maximize the value of OTI's effort. In Liberia, USAID partners such as Care, AfriCare and World Vision were achieving vital results, and OTI built a good deal of its programming with these same partners. In Serbia, the Soros Foundation's ongoing successes with media and civil society organizations persuaded OTI to partner with Soros in order to magnify results.

* ***Set up frameworks for others to invest in OUR successes.*** In Angola, a recent survey showed that an OTI-supported Voice of America (VOA) program had a listenership of 59%, making it the most popular VOA program in the world (based on the percentage of a country's listener population). This program has proven to be so effective that the Mission is considering funding VOA's programs. And in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, OTI set up three field offices, giving USAID coverage of five of the eleven provinces in the country. Recently, the Mission has stated that it will actively seek ways to support, collaborate with and build on OTI's initiatives.

* ***Develop and share a talent pool*** (e.g., OTI's database of over 400 names). Not surprisingly, OTI is frequently called upon to make staff and organization references to other donors. In 1997 the World Bank asked OTI to serve on a review panel of potential candidates for their post-conflict unit. OTI has found that the most effective staff for transitions activities are those that blend aspects of political savvy with humanitarian experience and development knowledge.

* ***Increase percentage of budgets for research and development.*** In essence, although Ecclesiastes notes -- *that which has been is what will be, that which is done is what will be done, and there is nothing new under the sun* -- donor activity during transitions brings existing experience and knowledge into a new context. Therefore, applied research, or "trial and error," is the most effective means of determining what policies, activities, and mechanisms might have the most impact during a transition. And, such trial and error efforts need to be evaluated, studied and shared with other donors so that experiences can be compared and lessons can be learned.

Increasing U.S. Government Expectations --

The demands for OTI services are increasing significantly based on its successes and as opportunities are better recognized and understood. More demands on funding existing programs, increased demands for new country programs, Missions and Bureaus asking for continued OTI funding and longer commitments ... all are helping to stretch OTI to the limit.

The sheer number of countries in transition is impressive, as shown by a 1997 OTI survey which cross-referenced more than 15 early warning lists of countries in conflict. This survey indicated that in 1997 there were 47 countries potentially ripe for transition activities: 29 with on-going peace talks; 11 appearing on multiple lists; an additional 5 with significant U.S. interests; and 2 with high levels of media visibility. While, in absolute terms, the number of countries on this OTI watch list will probably not change, the "ripeness" of these countries for transition assistance will change. In the next couple of years, as countries such as Guatemala and the Philippines move closer to sustainable development needs and drop off of the watch list, other countries like Indonesia and Sudan might become suitable candidates for transition assistance.

As a result, in 1997 OTI determined that meeting the rising expectations within USAID, the U.S. Government foreign policy community, and other donors would require a significant commitment from the U.S. Government to increase OTI's budget. This Initiative, which was the single largest line item for increased BHR funding, would allow the Agency to respond favorably to the increasing number of requests, both planned and unplanned, for assistance for

countries in transition from crisis or on the brink of a crisis. The Agency over the past few years has gained considerable experience with its OTI, D/G and regional bureau transition programs. It is increasingly clear to other elements of the U.S. Government that USAID has and will continue to be an important resource for transitioning countries. And, by doing more in transition countries, the U.S. could have a greater influence in promoting peace and democracy around the world.

Building capacity --

OTI's experience with transition activities has taught us the importance of building local capacity at the earliest possible moment. Good capacity building generates local empowerment to control programs and projects, mobilizes local resources, develops pre-democracy decision-making processes, and improves sustainability. All of which helps transition communities from relief towards development. Table 1 presents the different types of local partners OTI worked with during FY 1997 in five active OTI countries.

Table 1: OTI's Local Partners (1997)

COUNTRY	Communities Funded	Indigenous NGOs Funded	Grassroots Organizations Funded
Angola	588 projects in 377 communities		
Former Yugoslavia		211 NGOs and Media Outlets	
Guatemala			
Liberia			76 peace supportive groups and village development committees
Rwanda		7 NGOs, Cooperatives, and Media organizations	Over 600 women's associations

Capacity building is incorporated in all OTI-funded programs. Examples of capacity building include:

* ***Identify and support existing capacities.*** OTI has found that existing indigenous capacity within conflict prone and transitional countries is often overlooked or underestimated by donor organizations. For example, in Bosnia there is a very active indigenous NGO population which, although not always versed in democratic processes or experience, is eager to take on new (and sometimes risky) roles in order to promote democracy and peace. OTI thus targets building capacity of active NGOs

in the Former Yugoslavia. Many donors, however, continue to focus their efforts on funding the activities of international NGOs and PVOs.

* ***Complement existing domestic/local knowledge and capacity with external support.*** In Rwanda, where associational behavior is a local norm, OTI focused on building the capacity of already existing or rehabilitated women's grassroots organizations. Because of the hardships endured throughout the decades in Rwanda, women have learned how to work together on certain activities. OTI has found that introducing or expanding democratic practices within these women's organizations has increased their capacity tremendously and has empowered members and organizations to take on increasingly important roles within their communities.

* ***Build new capacity early on, during the relief phases and/or support capacities established during the previous "development" phase of assistance.*** In Angola, community reactivation projects have focused on reconstruction of schools, health clinics, markets, road and bridge rehabilitation as well as microenterprise development, farmer training and agricultural production/marketing. This program differs significantly from most other "community development" activities in the level of community participation in and contribution to the activities ("ownership") -- no wages are paid and no food for work is provided, thus not initiating or perpetuating the cycle of dependency often seen in reconstruction/rehabilitation projects.

* ***Turn-key operations.*** In several countries, OTI has been able to turn the management and administration of its field operations over to local staff. This has happened when OTI field staff manage field operations in a participatory manner, with emphasis on training local staff (either on-the-job training or providing specialized training opportunities to staff), paying competitive salaries, requiring local staff to identify and monitor OTI-funded grantees and activities, conducting regular "all-staff" meetings, and selecting motivated and "like-minded" candidates. In Bosnia, foreign service nationals manage programs and activities with little OTI oversight in a number of field offices, after being managed initially by US-expatriates.

Likewise, in Rwanda many of OTI's local staff have been hired by other NGOs or have been selected for Government posts. Rather than look at this as a theft of valuable personnel, OTI sees this as an opportunity for OTI-trained staff to be able to share their knowledge with their new employees and colleagues, thus magnifying good management and democratic skills.

New Strategies/Tactics --

Prevention: Last year OTI proposed that it begin to explore prevention and mitigation opportunities in conflict-prone countries. During 1997 OTI investigated possible funding activities to help defuse ongoing violent conflicts or help prevent the outbreak of full-scale civil war. After assessment teams explored opportunities in a number of countries, OTI decided to test several prevention activities in Sri Lanka.

The U.S. Government supports the prevention of resumed conflict in areas the Government of Sri Lanka has recently gained control of after 14 years of rebel rule. Improving the quality of life of minority Tamil citizens residing and resettling in the Jaffna peninsula is key to preventing their return to violence. While the Government of Sri Lanka continues to quarrel over devolution of power issues, OTI determined that there are a number of activities that it could undertake in areas where minority citizens reside -- activities which may create an environment for peace. Therefore, starting in January 1997 OTI developed a portfolio of potential pilot activities focused on Jaffna in consultation with the U.S. Ambassador, USAID Mission, the Government of Sri Lanka, and possible implementing partners.

OTI's experience in Sri Lanka demonstrates the risks of working in countries where settlement has yet to occur. Additionally, it is possible that in certain instances prevention activities might be interpreted as challenging U.S. foreign policy strategies (e.g., where a policy of strict neutrality might not accommodate discussions with and activities focused on certain groups). Nevertheless, OTI remains committed to prevention and mitigation efforts, and will continue to assess the potential for these types of activities in transitional countries.

Media Activities. OTI has found that media activities are particularly suited to transition programs. Because wars or conflicts have political roots, OTI focuses on political solutions which involves providing objective information and airing alternative voices through media activities. Indeed, during 1997 OTI developed a media strategy for operating in transitional countries that focuses on four major stratagem. These strategies can be overlapping, independent, or even sequenced. The strategies are the following:

- 1) ***Support news and information programs*** (objective news, details of the peace accord, preparations for special events -- e.g., elections). Our assumption is that the provision of reliable, non-nationalistic, and non-partisan information will allow people to make better and informed decisions about security, democracy, and peace processes in their country. Our objective is to support/create such information providers, and to increase the audience for such information programs.
- 2) ***Grow alternative media*** (beyond news and information). Our assumption is that by supporting other voices and opinions through the media, political space will be opened between a nationalistic/propaganda point of view and citizens' opinions. Our objective is to identify moderate/non-sectarian/non or multi-ethnic/pro-democracy

media outlets (print, radio, TV, theater, or other), support the dissemination of their opinion and information, and encourage them to host citizen debates on key issues.

3) ***Mobilize popular participation*** (activists/civil society organizations using/working with the media to increase peace and democracy movements). Our assumption is that the impact of peace and democracy promoting individuals and groups will be expanded through broader media campaigns. Our objective, then, is to identify individuals and groups that are non-nationalist, pro-peace, pro-democracy, and influential within their communities and then connect them with appropriate media outlets in order to reach broader audiences and identify other/new activists.

4) ***Multiply the impact of other transition activities*** (public relations campaigns, paid advertisements, direct marketing, social marketing, etc.). Our assumption is that funding of political transition activities is usually insufficient to have an immediate and broad impact at the national level in most countries where OTI is active. Therefore, our objective is to mobilize creative, practical, and culturally sensitive local individuals to craft innovative campaigns that spread the "good news" about successful transition interventions and encourage a national sense of hope and confidence about the future.

At the end of 1997, OTI began to actively participate on the interagency International Public Information task force chaired by the National Security Council. This task force seeks to better coordinate U.S. Government communications activities focused on humanitarian crisis. Joint analysis of communications activities in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia have been initiated, and recommendations are being formulated regarding mass information campaigns, public opinion polling, technology and hardware needs, and other issues.

Civil Society Activities. Throughout 1997, OTI confirmed that not all civil society organizations and NGOs are actively seeking and/or capable of having a significant impact on the transition process in their relevant countries. Indeed, even when NGO and civil society leaders are able to articulate effective pro-democracy attitudes and behaviors, their actual activities are frequently less than impressive. This may be caused by a variety of factors, including: well meaning but marginalized civil society and NGO leaders who just don't have the ability to reach broader audiences; elitist organizations that are not interested in reaching the masses; corrupt individuals who are looking for rent-seeking opportunities; and a genuine unfamiliarity with democratic principles which limits organizations' abilities to promote democracy.

When promoting democracy in partnership with NGOs and civil society organizations, OTI has learned the following lessons:

- * Field staff must monitor grantees closely, so that if it is evident that impact is minimal, OTI can reassess the value of continued support.

- * Do not assume that other donors and their partners are as concerned with reaching mass audiences and populations as is OTI.
- * When effective and genuine civil society organizations are identified, targeted training and capacity building might be required to maximize impact (e.g., training in operating information campaigns, leadership training, training in appearing on TV or the radio).
- * Sometimes, it may be necessary to help individuals and/or nascent organizations become formal civil society organizations or NGOs.

The relationship between post-conflict transitions and criminal behavior. OTI and other donors have found a direct corollary between post-war decreases in military violence and increasing levels of violence due to criminal activities. Variables responsible for the frequent experienced increase in criminal activity in post-conflict settings include:

- * Returning refugee populations that have been socialized by criminal elements (such as youth groups returning to Central America after years in the barrios of Los Angeles);
- * Unsuccessfully reintegrated fighting groups that continue hostilities that are now considered to be criminal in the post-settlement phase (such as some rebel groups in Mindanao, the Philippines, who were not included in the peace processes);
- * Criminal groups that no longer have the cover of the war to disguise their activities;
- * Marginalized groups that still do not have access to productive economic resources, and may be turning to crime as some sort of last resort (such as youth groups who do not have the education or experience to find jobs);
- * A history of crime that the peace and democracy processes have yet to address (as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where crime permeated almost all sectors of society during the Mobutu era); and
- * Unhappy political elements which support criminal groups (as sort of domestic mercenaries) to deliberately disrupt the transition towards peace and democracy (as rightist elements in the ARENA party are alleged to have done in El Salvador).

Increased criminal activities and crime-induced violence thus characterizes many of the countries where OTI has been working (particularly in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Former Yugoslavia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). Therefore, if OTI and other donors use statistics on the levels and degree of violence as an indicator of the progress of the transition, we might find that our results are being obscured by increasing criminal violence. Donors should also be wary of criminal statistics in many countries, since statistics are

difficult to gather, and most seem to be based on someone's guesstimate on how prevalent violent crime is in a particular country. In FY 1997 OTI began to research ways to address this issue through transition programming, but has yet to determine appropriate activities. Nevertheless, OTI continues close collaboration with the Global Bureau's Democracy and Governance Center on this issue.

Linking relief to development. One of the reasons for the increasing demand for OTI's transition assistance is because traditional development and humanitarian assistance do not always have the right tools and mandates (e.g., authorities and contextual experience, timing and money) for promoting political solutions in conflict-prone countries. OTI's four years of experience with political transitions has revealed that in addition to linking relief to development, there is a need to link democracy to relief.

In some countries where OTI has focused its programming, there is little to no domestic/local capacity for democratic action. Too often target groups are forced to focus on survival needs to the exclusion of any other activities. When OTI and other organizations attempt to support target groups to link nascent participatory decision-making practices to further democratic activities, the target groups lack the capacity to follow-through. For example, the lack of literacy among rural women is often cited as a barrier to their participation in donor funded conferences, training opportunities, and interaction with central governments.

Lately, OTI has begun to discuss possible responses to this problem with other donors, offices within USAID, and the PVO/NGO community. For example, it might be advantageous to build capacity linked to transition needs during the relief phases of donor assistance. This could conceivably include such activities as building "virtual" schools (where lay teachers would be identified and trained from the refugee population, and adult literacy programs initiated -- then when the refugee population was returned, virtual schools (complete with teachers) would be returned together). Other possible activities include community radio programs in refugee camps, with inexpensive equipment returned with trained refugees; participatory problem solving training; conflict resolution mechanisms explored; and more. Then, as donors and others begin to work with populations during the "transition phase" of complex emergencies, there might be improved capacity upon which to build.

B) FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE IN 1997:

Underlying Assumptions - Identifying the Central Political Development Issues --

OTI has developed some basic assumptions about working in the post-conflict period which are not unique to OTI, but are derived from certain field experiences. These assumptions include:

- * A modicum of security is a threshold issue to restoration of political and economic life.

- * Political development is best achieved in the absence of a strong central authority through community-based programs which emphasize process over product, but which provide a tangible or visible result from communal decision-making.¹
- * Partnerships within the U.S. government and with other donors are essential to sustain the programs which have been developed to address the post-conflict environment.
- * Humanitarian assistance will most likely continue in the immediate post-conflict period, but this assistance should be tied into the rehabilitation programming.

Based on these assumptions and the criteria for engagement,² OTI makes decisions to fund transition activities in conflict-prone countries. Thus, in FY 1997, OTI actively promoted peace and security in Angola, the Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro), Guatemala, Liberia, and Rwanda. Programs in the Philippines, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were initiated towards the end of the fiscal year. OTI's program in Haiti concluded,³ and its programs in Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka were later placed on hold due to changes in the security situation. And throughout the year OTI conducted numerous assessments of the relevance of transition programs in other countries around the world -- at the request of other offices within USAID, within the US government, by other bilateral and multilateral donors, and by NGOs.

Factors affecting performance --

Several macro-level factors influence OTI's performance, including the nature of transitions, funding mechanisms and operating principles, and changing security situations.

Multiple Transitions. One of the major factors affecting OTI's performance is the nature of transitions in conflict-prone countries. As OTI has gained experience in

¹A debate exists within the donor community and other experts over whether communal development must be coupled with a more restrictive approach to reestablishing central authority. A consensus is developing that suggests the need for a more restrictive approach to creating a central authority, often with external assistance. But there is also great support for strengthening local communities with an eye toward making them sufficient to rekindle political life. Since civil society continues to exist even when a state collapses, donors have been drawn to support grass-roots programs. However, in the long-run, civil society cannot fill a vacuum nationally, and some form of government ultimately will be needed to create laws, provide security and promote public order. (See Zartman, *op cit.*, p.271.)

²OTI has developed a four-part test which it uses to identify countries which might benefit from transition funding. 1) Is the country "ripe" for OTI assistance? 2) How does the country affect our national interests? 3) Can OTI resources address the key political development issues in the transition? and 4) Will the investment produce a successful outcome?

³Results on the Haiti program were incorporated into OTI's FY 1996 R4 report.

programming in transition countries, working within the U.S. foreign policy community, and discussing transitions with experts from around the world, we have been able to fine-tune our understandings of transitions. Notably, as our knowledge about transition grows, new issues and questions about transitions also grows.

Essentially, OTI has found that there are many types of transitions and there are many stages of transitions.

* ***Four Types of Transitions:*** At any given time, transitions from war to peace, transitions to democracy, relief to development transitions, and transitions to market economies could be occurring together. Any of these transitions alone would require the supreme efforts of all the parties engaged (host governments, citizens, refugees, regional actors, NGOs, civil society, donors, militaries, former enemies, etc.). But the reality is that most conflict-prone countries are experiencing at least two types of transitions, and many are undergoing all four. Moreover, movement along each type of transition's timeline will most likely not coincide with progress for another type of transition. Given that there are multiple types of transitions occurring in most of the countries where OTI is engaged, OTI is required to have flexible, quick, high impact, and visible programs in order to maximize possible impacts and remain relevant to the transition context. Measuring the impact of such assistance is difficult, as progress within each type of transition can be variable and because transitions are not linear processes.

* ***Different Stages of Transition:*** In addition to different types of transitions, there are also different stages of transition possible within a country or region. For example, one part of the country could be at one stage of the transition -- where an influx of significant numbers of returnees occurs in one area of the country, requiring projects focused on survival -- while other parts of the country could be further along in the transition -- where income generating projects and political participation are possible. Or, everything could be proceeding fairly evenly throughout a country, and then something happens to change the circumstances so definitively that a "new" transition begins, e.g.. a coup occurs. Again, measuring the impact of assistance is fraught with problems, and progress during transitions is chaotic.

Because of the complexity embedded in the very concept of transition, different operating units within USAID (and among different donors) define transition differently. The Global Bureau's Democracy Center focuses on the concept of transitional democracy -- movement from authoritarian to more democratic governance; OTI concentrates more on the process of transitioning to and out of political conflict; while the Europe and Newly Independent States Bureau focuses more on transitioning from command to market economies; and various parts of the Agency are more interested in the transition from relief to sustainable development.

As OTI, other operating units within USAID (particularly Missions) and other donors begin to program for a particular transition context, such variability in definitions, stages, and types of simultaneous transitions makes planning a complex and exhausting process. Determining the criteria for exiting and/or handing-off transition assistance can become a controversial issue, as different operating units have distinct concepts of when transitions start, how they progress, and when they "end."

This suggests that OTI, and its partners, need to clarify their different mandates, understand that differences exist in conceptualizing transitions, and establish transparent and measurable criteria and targets for engagement and disengagement. It is important to make sure that USAID does not lose OTI's flexibility and to recognize that the limitations of all USAID resources is such that our partners might well be another donor or organization.

Funding mechanisms and operating principles.

Although other offices within the Agency have developed appropriate and innovative approaches to promoting democracy and governance in sustainable development countries, until the creation of OTI the Agency lacked the capacity to respond to political crisis with political activities. Thus, OTI can focus on building democracy during humanitarian assistance programs and in non-presence countries, and then link such activities to development assistance.

Along with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, OTI uses IDA in order to maintain flexible and aggressive programs in order to respond to political crisis. IDA funding comes with "Notwithstanding" authority (which OTI has invoked relatively infrequently,) which can speed up contracting processes such as recruitment of field staff, reduce the numbers of waivers, etc. needed for contracts to move actions, and allow for the waiving of Buy America rules, when necessary. As timeliness is one of the most important factors in successful OTI programs, IDA allows OTI to act quickly in promoting transitions in priority conflict-prone countries.

Unfortunately, however, OTI has often experienced uncertainty within the Agency about the source of OTI funding and about the nature of the authorities and mechanisms that come with IDA. In particular, in countries where OTI remains active after OFDA's programs wind down, OTI often faces apprehensions among contracting and other USAID staff in accepting OTI's use of notwithstanding and other special mechanisms that come with IDA.

One of the lessons OTI has learned is that it is necessary to educate Missions, Regional Centers, field staff, and Washington staff about OTI's relationship to and use of IDA. In 1998 OTI will, therefore, prepare a memo/cable (using OFDA's cable as a model) that it can use to explain IDA and OTI.

Additionally, OTI is developing a new mechanism, the Support While Implementing Fast Transition (SWIFT) procurement contract which will provide support for OTI's field activities. This contract attempts to establish a world-wide mechanism that will give OTI field offices the ability to implement timely, tangible and targeted grants and facilitate OTI country start-up operations. The mechanism will provide OTI with an on-call, on-site procurement agent that:

- * rapidly procures commodities, technical service or provides cash grants to OTI partners implementing field grants.
- * procures and delivers in a timely way supplies and equipment necessary to operationalize OTI field offices.

Nevertheless, it is of paramount importance for the Agency to address the continuing hesitation on the part of some USAID staff to apply IDA authorities and mechanisms to OTI activities. OTI-supported activities can not produce results and impacts during political transitions in conflict-prone countries if it is not allowed to operate effectively and with the authorities both President Clinton and Administrator Atwood expect.


Turbulent Times. Because the security situation is so fragile in most countries OTI has programs, even small events can radically change the context of transition assistance. During 1997, OTI had two country programs where the security context changed significantly, requiring an emergency evacuation of staff in Sierra Leone, and a complete reassessment of OTI's strategy in Sri Lanka. At almost the same time, the security situation in the Republic of Srbska was reportedly changing drastically for the worse. Fortunately, OTI's field staff found that the situation was not as dire as the press was reporting, and OTI successfully maintained its relevant presence in the entity.

- * In **Sierra Leone**, a military coup resulted in exile of the democratically elected government of President Tejan Kabbah. The serious deterioration in the security situation after the coup forced OTI to suspend implementation of its transition program through the end of the fiscal year pending improved security conditions and increased political stability.

- * In **Sri Lanka**, events such as the U.S. Government denouncement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as an international terrorist organization (and the possible LTTE reaction to this denouncement); increased incidents of LTTE suicide bombings; delays in the fulfillment of promises made by the Government of Sri Lanka to open road access to Jaffna; and LTTE attacks on ships and helicopters headed to or from the North all caused the security situation to deteriorate dramatically from the situation at the time of OTI's initial assessments. This resulted in a re-evaluation of OTI's involvement in Sri Lanka, although it might be possible to fund transition activities sometime in the future.

Although these factors have affected OTI's performance in seven of the nine countries where it had activities in 1997, OTI was able to positively influence the transition process in Guatemala, Angola, the Former Yugoslavia, Liberia, and Rwanda. In both Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone, the security situation deteriorated preventing OTI from carrying out its strategy. And activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Philippines are too new to be affected by these macro-level performance obstacles.

USAID/BHR/OTI Results Framework and Link to Agency Goal




PART II: PROGRESS TOWARD OBJECTIVES

A. Performance Overview Summary

OTI has programs in Asia/Near East, Africa, Europe and the Newly Independent States, and Latin America/Caribbean. As demonstrated in Figure 1, in 1997 most of OTI's program funding focused on Africa (53%), on the Former Yugoslavia (26%), on Haiti and Guatemala (16%), and in Asia (5%).

Figure 1



In FY 1997, OTI actively promoted peace and security in Angola (ANG), the Former Yugoslavia (FMRYU), Guatemala (GUA), Liberia (LIB), and Rwanda (RWA). Programs in the Philippines and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were initiated in late FY 1997. Thus, by the end of the fiscal year, no results are significant enough to report. OTI's programs experienced setbacks in Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka due to notable changes in the security situation. The program in Sierra Leone was, therefore, placed on hold throughout the calendar year. The program in Sri Lanka was reevaluated and to date, we are still waiting for our country selection criteria to be met before engagement. Therefore, for assessing OTI's overall performance for FY 1997, the rating is based on programs in five countries.

Performance rating --

Table 2: Summary of Performance by Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results

Objectives and IRs	Rating
SO 1: Political transitions successfully advanced in priority, conflict-prone countries.	In general, most of the countries where OTI is actively working, there has been notable progress toward advancing political transitions.
IR 1: Enhanced citizen security	Freedom of movement improved in all five countries, where OTI is actively working. However, the lack of integration of ex-combatants and returned refugees and IDPs indicates that security could be improved.
IR 2: Democratic political processes initiated, reestablished, or expanded (pre-democracy building).	Most countries where OTI is actively working showed an increase in freedom of speech and alternative voices. However, democratic processes as demonstrated by local and national governments working together and institutionalization of democratic practices within governments remains weak.
IR 3: Improved targeting of OTI interventions.	In most OTI countries, OTI assessed outcomes and recalibrated target groups and redefined strategies (when needed).

Explanation of rating: Program activities from Angola, the Former Yugoslavia, Guatemala, Liberia and Rwanda were rated based on assessments of OTI activities gleaned from a review of program documentation, discussions with program managers and field staff, reviews of Mission R4s, and conversations with other donors. (A summary of the findings from OTI's activities review can be found in Annex II of this document). The information from these reports and interviews was ranked according to field related indicators. Country achievements, per field indicator, are summarized and placed in the context of OTI's results framework, which was adjusted to reflect the nature of democratic transitions and activities in the field. Most of the field indicators are new. OTI did not rate its performance against baselines or targets.

B. RESULTS REVIEW

A. Performance of the Strategic Objective 1: Transitions successfully advanced in priority, conflict-prone countries

This is OTI's only Strategic Objective (SO), and focuses on macro level changes within the countries where OTI has active programs. Although focused on the macro level, this SO "rolls up" results and impact from field level activities. Because OTI is a field driven office, we have determined that the best way to measure the overall impact of our activities around the globe is to aggregate trends by country, provide evidence of a positive trend, and then explain negative trends.

This SO takes into account the work of other offices within the Agency (most importantly the Missions), other agencies of the U.S. government, bilateral and multilateral donors, indigenous organizations, and other implementing partners. The SO is also linked to the strategies of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, the Democracy and Governance Center of the Global Bureau, Mission R4s, and other bureaus of USAID. **In general, most of the countries where OTI is actively working, there has been significant progress toward advancing political transitions.**

Table 3: Summary of SO1

SO: Transitions successfully advanced in priority, conflict-prone countries	ANG	FMRYU	GUA	LIB	RWA
Progress toward establishment of a participatory governance	Yes	Yes	Not a focus	Not yet	Yes
Progress toward establishment and equitable application of rule of law	Not a focus	Not a focus	Not a focus	Not a focus	Yes
Progress towards civilian control over security.	Not yet	Not a focus	Yes	Yes	Not a focus
Progress towards sustainable development	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Not yet

ANALYSIS:

Indicator: Progress toward establishment of a participatory governance --

Of the four countries where OTI focuses on this OTI/W indicator, three of the countries showed progress. Programs in Angola, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda all demonstrated increased level of participatory governance.

* OTI-funded projects in **Angola** focused on participatory decision-making at the community level. In areas that bridged rebel-controlled and Government of Angola-controlled territories, these community-based activities encouraged former enemies to begin to work together and promoted a process of reconciliation as evidenced by mutual collaboration on building and sustaining schools, roads, community buildings, and markets. Additionally, as communities established markets on the border between the two entities, and as trade and commerce grew, a sense of participatory local governance has spread.

* In the **Former Yugoslavia**, recent political events in the Republika Srpska (RS) signify that OTI has had a positive impact on the developing political situation in Bosnia (the RS in particular, and the region as a whole). OTI supported TV and radio stations (11), and newspapers and news agencies (12), have been at the forefront in reporting on, and in informing the public about, the RS's widening political crisis. All of President Plavsic's comments concerning the unfolding political crisis, government corruption, economic discontent and war profiteering are being widely disseminated by OTI grantees.

Moreover, it should be noted that this crisis, and, more specifically, stories about corruption in the RS, have been playing out for some time (for more than a year and a half in OTI supported newspapers and journals). It is only recently, however, given the President's active involvement, that they have come to the fore politically.

In sum, the developing political situation in the RS is an excellent example of where OTI's efforts have played an instrumental role in laying the groundwork for: (1) reshaping public attitudes and perceptions; and (2) bringing needed political pressure to bear.

* The Government of **Rwanda** has committed itself to decentralization and to participatory decision-making at the local level. Early on, the USAID Mission funded a local governance initiative which is working in 12 pilot communes to encourage localities to develop a process for local-based participation in deciding resource allocation to benefit their community. To support this effort, OTI has provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Interior. According to the Mission, activities funded by this technical assistance has increased national confidence in the Government of Rwanda's commitment to participatory local governance.

ANECDOTE: OTI and Mission funded local governance activities have increased the participation of citizens in political processes.

Elections of Development Committees in **Rwanda**: The OTI-funded technical assistance unit participated in setting out strategies of selection of citizen development committees in communes, a system in which representatives of communities have been chosen in a participatory and fair way. E.g, during the first election meeting in KINYAMAKARA-GIKONGORO, some local leaders came with a list of people that they had previously chosen for the community . After discussions, the population rejected this idea and decided to use a “secret whisper election system” as their approach. The resulting election produced candidates that were not among the previous list the local leaders had provided.

Results have been less than notable in **Liberia**, where the post-war transition is characterized by the institutionalization of less than democratic government. Although not unique to Liberia, such governments (although often elected through "free and fair" processes) may be led by authoritative regimes and even peppered with suspected war criminals. Although OTI looks for ways to contain negative behaviors, progress is sometimes stunted when institutions are still learning democratic principles.

Indicator: Progress toward establishment and equitable application of rule of law --

Four of the five countries where OTI is active did not focus on this OTI/W indicator. In the only country where this was a focus, **Rwanda** made progress through activities such as: providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice; funding of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); and dissemination of the proceeding of the ICTR through radio broadcasts in Rwanda and in surrounding countries.

One of the major assumptions of academics and other experts in transition has been that this indicator is a primary sign of progress toward the advancement of transitions. The belief is that until war criminals are dealt with in any satisfactory manner, until human rights abuses are either eliminated or are reduced to indigenously acceptable levels, and until redress of disputes is possible, security and stability will be compromised. OTI's singular focus on rule of law in Rwanda suggests that either the context in other OTI countries was not conducive to such programming; or that other peace treaties or settlement agreements in other countries contained appropriate mechanisms for laying some foundation for rule of law.

Because of the challenges of proving the reality of the assumption that all transition programs need to deal directly with rule of law issues, OTI/Washington will continue to assess the validity of including this indicator in our results framework.

Indicator: Progress towards civilian control over security --

Two of the three countries where OTI activities were focused on this indicator made progress. Both in Guatemala and Liberia, there was an increased degree of military disengagement and demobilization of ex-combatants reduced military control over security matters. Whereas in Angola, attempts were made to demobilize significant numbers of fighters, but because of continued insecurity and uncertain expectations of future stability, Angolans remain prepared

to continue some degree of the armed struggle as is evident by the 50% desertion rate of "demobilized" ex-combatants.

Indicator: Progress towards sustainable development --

In four of the five countries where OTI is actively engaged, progress has been significant in moving towards development assistance and programming.

- * In **Angola** almost 2,000,000 people have been reached by mine awareness training and more than 750 Angolans have been trained by OTI-funded NGOs in mine removal techniques. This has resulted in a significant reduction in mine accidents and in the re-opening of some important areas of the country to commerce, agriculture, and the return of refugees and displaced persons. The various mine action activities so far have made possible or facilitated the programming and implementation of well over \$200 million in disaster relief, transition, and development activities directly benefiting several million Angolans.

- * OTI-funded programs in the **Former Yugoslavia** have had varying degrees of assimilation within development programming, depending on the entity (Bosnia, the Republika Srpska, Croatia, and Serbia). For example, in Serbia OTI has coordinated extensively with the ENI Bureau, including agreement on the sequencing of funding for OTI activities. In Srpska, for example, progress towards development assistance has been slower, because OTI was the only U.S. Government organization in this entity until very recently. Now, the possibility of hand-off of selected activities has improved as ENI establishes an office in the entity.

- * In **Guatemala**, OTI participated in helping to develop the U.S. Government's response to the peace accord. This process involved close coordination with the Mission and other donors on the sequencing, relationships, and planning between humanitarian assistance operations and development assistance operations.

- * UNDP and USAID's Africa Bureau partnered with OTI in **Liberia** on the creation of short-term post-demobilization employment through the civil reconstruction teams. Future partnerships are in development.

In **Rwanda**, there have been substantial levels of coordination with development programming and small amounts of leveraging of development assistance funding. However, by the end of FY 1997 little progress had been made in significant funding of OTI activities by other donors' development programs. OTI has confidence that relevant programs will be incorporated into donor strategies and USAID's program plans in the future.

Performance of Intermediate Results (IRs):

Activities supporting achievement of the SO are clustered around three Intermediate Results: IR-1 Enhanced citizen security; IR-2 Democratic political processes initiated; and IR-3 Improved targeting of OTI interventions. These results packages are closely linked with and supported by our implementing partners and by USAID Missions, Bureaus, and other offices. The first two IRs were included in last year's R4. The third one is new. Most of the indicators are also new.

B. Performance of IR-1: Enhanced citizen security --

IR1 seeks to measure the overall trend, pattern, and results of OTI country activities which focus on security issues. **Freedom of movement improved in all five countries, where OTI is actively working. However, the lack of integration of ex-combatants and returned refugees and IDPs indicates that security could be improved.**

Table 4: Summary of IR1

IR-1: Enhanced citizen security	ANG	FMRYU	GUA	LIB	RWA
Reintegration of ex-combatants	Insufficient	Not a focus	Yes	Partial	Not a focus
Progress toward freedom of movement and some sense of security	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of returned IDPs/refugees to their communities	Yes	Yes	Minimal	Minimal	Maybe

ANALYSIS:

Indicator: Reintegration of ex-combatants --

OTI had demobilization and reintegration activities in Angola, Guatemala, and Liberia. Of these three countries, there was significant progress in Guatemala.

* OTI began providing assistance to the USAID Mission in **Guatemala** in 1996 to support planning for the demobilization and incorporation of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). After an initial visit in November 1996, OTI supported a plan to work in coordination with the United Nations and the European Union to meet the immediate needs of the government to implement the accords. Initially, OTI worked continuously with the UN Mission in Guatemala by participating on a logistical assessment for the peace observation mission; then later, OTI worked with FONAPAZ, the Government of Guatemala's agency charged with peace accord implementation, to develop an operational plan for the demobilization process.

Through OTI programs, all 2,940 URNG ex-combatants and 1,722 special military police received were demobilized in eight camps. Of those demobilized, 1,100 ex-combatants received vocational training, and 400 ex-military registered for OTI-funded training and apprenticeship programs. OTI also funded a project to provide 382 ex-combatants with self-sustaining, livelihoods.

One noteworthy impact of this activity is that the overall security situation improved. For example, few of the total ex-combatants have been implicated in criminal activities, and **none** of the ex-combatants who received OTI-funded vocational training have been implicated in criminal activities. Additionally, because of the participatory

structure of OTI's demobilization activities (e.g., sharing information with communities surrounding the camps and educating the ex-combatants about civic responsibilities), there has been no public reaction to ex-combatants and few threats have been made against them.

Reintegration and demobilization activities were also carried out in **Liberia** and **Angola**. In Liberia there was almost perfect disengagement (because most of the military leaders ordered the fighting to end), but only partial demobilization occurred. In Angola, where OTI was involved in the quartering, civic training and demobilization activities for ex-combatants, and 10,000 ex-combatants actually demobilized, and received some civic training. However, the desertion rate was around 50%, as ex-combatants returned to active fighting.

Indicator: Progress toward freedom of movement and some sense of security --

In all five of the countries where OTI has had active programs related to this indicator, there has been an increase in freedom of movement which contributed to improving citizen security. To one degree or another, the following activities were instrumental in generating these positive results:

- * Availability of objective and timely information in **Angola, Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda** and **Liberia** allowed populations (e.g., refugees, IDPs, women, ex-combatants) to make their own decisions about whether it was safe to return.
- * Effective demining and mine awareness activities in **Angola** contributed to freedom of movement by increasing opportunities for agriculture and commerce through activities which cleared roads and marked mined areas.
- * OTI funded programs in **Guatemala** focused on the ex-combatants and allowed citizens to return to "normalcy" without fears that the fighting would impede their activities.
- * In **Rwanda**, there is an increasing feeling of security among OTI-funded grassroots women's association members. Economic and livelihood security increased throughout OTI-targeted areas, although personal security remained a problem in regions experiencing continued violence.

Indicator: Number of returned IDPs/refugees to their communities --

In four of the countries where OTI had active programs related to security, there was a significant increase in the number of IDP and refugee returns. In Angola and the Former Yugoslavia the numbers were high; there was a minimal number of returns in Liberia and Guatemala. Activities in Rwanda did not directly focus on return of refugees.

- * In **Angola**, the mine action activities and information broadcasts by Radio 2000, contributed to IDPs (and some refugees) returning back to their communities because they knew it was safe[r].

* OTI funded mine awareness campaigns In the **Former Yugoslavia**, as well as support to returnee-based advocacy organizations, contributed to the return of many refugees.

* In **Liberia**, OTI-funded grantee Star Radio provided key information about political, economic, and social events in the country which contributed to refugee and IDP knowledge about the conditions in their former communities.

* OTI funded the return of two hundred and eighteen rebel ex-combatants to **Guatemala** as part of the demobilization project.

The OTI-funded Women in Transition (WIT) program in **Rwanda**, was mobilized in Rwanda before the massive return of refugees, which meant that WIT was one of the few donor projects which was well positioned to meet the unexpected needs of this population. One unintended but positive consequence of OTI's program was to help create a sense of security even among refugees not receiving WIT attention (but who had heard about the program), thereby allowing them to return more confidently to other communities.

ANECDOTE: the Women in Transition (WIT) project in Rwanda convinced refugees to settle in certain places:

The Ministry of Gender's Representative at Musasa (which borders Gisenyi, and is one of the areas where violence continues to this date), stated that before the war she was a commune secretary and her husband was a conseiller. When the genocide started they protected people at their home, and did not flee the area. The RPA moved fairly quickly into this area, liberated it, and reappointed her husband to his same position. Amazingly, given the couple's previous political alliances, she was appointed the Ministry of Gender's communal representative. When refugees returned to Musasa they were surprised that she and her husband were still alive -- many had been told in the Zaire camps that they had been killed by the RPA. She has been a driving force in working with women's associations and restoring people's confidence. She has stated that until WIT started working in Musasa, people felt they were forgotten because little, if any, international or government assistance was forthcoming. She also said that WIT's interventions restored hope to people that someone (anyone) was willing to help them. WIT has funded 11 projects in Musasa.

C. Performance of IR-2: Democratic political processes initiated, reestablished, or expanded (pre-democracy building) --

IR-2 seeks to measure the overall trend, pattern, and results of OTI country activities which focus on democratic processes. **Most countries where OTI is actively working showed an increase in freedom of speech and alternative voices. However, democratic processes as demonstrated by local and national governments working together and institutionalization of democratic practices within governments remains weak.**

Table 5: Summary of IR-2

IR-2: Democratic political processes initiated, reestablished, or expanded	ANG	FMRYU	GUA	LIB	RWA
Increase in political and economic power sharing	Yes	Yes	Not sure	No	Yes
Increased capacity of local and national governments to work together	Minimal	No	Not a focus	Yes	Yes
Progress made toward the institutionalization of government and private-sector services.	GOA not responsive	Not a focus	Minimal focus	Minimal	Yes
Increased freedom of speech and alternative voices	Yes	Yes	Minimal focus	Yes	Minimal

ANALYSIS:

Indicator: Progress toward political and economic power sharing --

Out of the four countries where OTI funds activities relevant to this indicator, Angola, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda demonstrated an increase in political and economic power sharing. In Guatemala, the results are questionable because of the newness of the program.

* In **Angola**, OTI's community reactivation program requires a participatory decision-making process in identifying priority activities, and necessitates contributions of labor and other resources from the community in order to receive funding. Most of the projects chosen by these communities have focused on the rehabilitation of schools (around 50% of all activities), roads, bridges, and other public infrastructure. Some of the income generating activities have encouraged participants to share resources with others in the community. For example, after schools were constructed, and teachers provided, the community found ways to continue to support the salaries of the teachers and the purchase of educational supplies.

* Grassroots women's associations in **Rwanda** cultivated both economic and political power sharing through OTI-funded activities. Through WIT, 362 income generating projects restarted depressed local economies and entrepreneurial activities. This increased opportunities for women to make decisions about their individual priorities and needs, and to discuss how to collaborate in problem solving and implementation of activities as a group.

* In 1997, OTI funded 10 community impact projects in the **Former Yugoslavia**. These projects were identified by community groups through a participatory process, and focused on activities that would increase opportunities for former enemies to interact.

Unfortunately, OTI activities in **Guatemala** have not resulted in any discernable increase in political and/or economic power sharing. Although significant numbers of ex-combatants

have received vocational training that should allow them to reintegrate back into society as productive members, the program is still too nascent to determine such an outcome.

Indicator: Capacity of local and national governments to work together --

OTI activities in Liberia, Rwanda, and to some extent in Angola, resulted in an increased capacity of local and national governments to work together toward common goals. In Angola and the former Yugoslavia the relationship between local and national governments remains antagonistic and fraught with tension. This may be due to the fact that significant political and military players have never really committed to the peace and settlement processes.

* Four months of technical assistance to the Ministry of Plan in **Liberia** helped to set the tone that meaningful reconciliation should take place at the community level. In 1997, this became the overt strategy of the international community and the government of Liberia.

* In **Rwanda**, the OTI-funded Local Governance and Participatory Development Unit in the Ministry of Interior has strengthened the relationship between the Ministry and community participatory development activities carried out by the USAID Mission. The Unit provided technical support to USAID's Local Governance Initiative and ensured the monitoring and follow up of its activities. In general, the Unit played the role of catalyst to strengthen the project follow up by the Ministry. In a recent speech, the Vice President referred to decentralization explaining that government structures have to be more participatory and citizens have to be more responsible for their own development.

ANECDOTE: Community school project in Angola.

OTI-funded community activities in Angola have developed a system whereby the community provides labor and resources to build schools, and the UNITA or NPLA Central government is required to support teacher salaries for at least one year. As a result, the community is stimulated to mobilize its resources to buy books and other education materials.

* In Angola, while there has been some movement towards local and national governments working together, this progress has been retarded by the lack of adherence to the peace process by certain political leaders. Therefore, local and national levels of coordination has increased only to some extent.

Indicator: Progress made toward the institutionalization of government and private-sector services --

In 1997, Rwanda was the only country where OTI focused on capacity building at either the national or local government levels. Some minimal achievement was reached in Guatemala and in Liberia.

* By providing technical assistance and advice to the **Rwandan** Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Gender and Family, OTI activities supported the national government in developing regulations and laws (e.g. Ministry of Justice), policy formulation (e.g., Ministry of Interior), and reaching out to rural constituencies (e.g., Ministries of Interior and Gender and Family). Additionally, positive findings from an OTI-supported audit of the Ministry of Interior will enable the Government of Rwanda to directly receive other USAID and donor funding. This will allow the government to take responsibility for implementing development projects in the future.

* As mentioned earlier, OTI provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Plan in **Liberia** during FY 1997. To some degree, this has helped to build the capacity of a government ministry to focus on the community level.

* Although there has been a minimal focus on building capacity of the national government in **Guatemala**, the government has made a sincere effort to support the institutionalization of the peace process, as demonstrated by the fact that the Guatemalan Government has funded one-third of the military demobilization process and has participated effectively in the reduction of the overall military staff by one third.

Indicator: Progress toward freedom of speech and alternative voices --

Media is a key instrument for promoting democratic processes, and has often been misused by nationalistic, ethnic, and corrupt governments to incite tensions, cleavages, war, and genocide. Because wars have political roots, OTI focuses on political solutions which involves providing objective information and airing alternative voices through media activities. In Angola, the Former Yugoslavia, and Liberia strong increases in freedom of speech and alternative voices occurred as a result of OTI-funded activities. While there were some media activities in Guatemala and Rwanda, this was not a particular focus of our programming and results for this indicator were minimal. However, the trend overall shows that media activities are an important ingredient in post-conflict transitions.

* In the **Former Yugoslavia**, OTI's media activities have formed the main strategy in our transition programming in this regional program. OTI's assistance to the creation and/or expansion of 11 TV stations, 27 radios, and 22 newspapers has resulted in increasing their capacity to provide freer, more independent news and democracy programming.

Useful and democratic content has been provided through nearly 2,000 TV and radio broadcasts, 3,222,000 alternative/independent newspapers, 108,000 pro-democracy posters, over a million brochures, and fifteen public service announcements. This has been instrumental in setting reformist political agendas.

ANECDOTE: An Example of Where OTI's Media Approach and Programming Has Had An Impact:

Recent political events in the Republika Srpska indicate that OTI has had a significant impact on the developing political situation in Bosnia, the RS in particular, and the region as a whole. OTI supported TV and radio stations, and newspapers and news agencies, have been at the forefront in reporting on the widening political crisis in the RS and setting the political agenda. Stories about the unfolding political crisis, government corruption, economic discontent and war profiteering are being widely disseminated by OTI grantees. This has resulted in increasing public support for reformist government elements, and has helped to mobilize citizens around "moderate" political leaders.

In sum, the developing political situation in the RS is an excellent example of where OTI's efforts have played an important role in laying the groundwork for assisting in the reshaping of public attitudes and perceptions (e.g., about corruption).

* In April 1997, station management of independent FM Radio 2000 in **Angola** was told by a local Ministry of Information official that they were specifically prohibited from rebroadcasting the daily half hour VOA special program of VOA's Portuguese to Africa service. Radio 2000 was the only station inside Angola carrying this programming, and was believed by many Angolans to be the most informative and unbiased source of information available in Angola. This could indicate that the GOA believed that Radio 2000 was having a positive impact on informing Angolans about their political situation. Radio 2000 is still broadcasting, despite the initial prohibition by the GOA.

A recent survey indicates that VOA programs are listened to by 59% of the population, making this VOA's most listened to program in the world based on the percentage of a country's listener population.

* In **Liberia** media activities were instrumental in providing factual information as well as relaying critical information to electoral workers and the larger population. Voter education information and poll-worker information messages ran on eight radio stations, keeping the population informed about a number of last minute election changes, and resulted in producing an organized election.

* OTI-funded social communication campaigns in **Guatemala** have raised awareness of the rights of ex-combatants who are attempting to reintegrate back into society.

* In 1997 an OTI-grantee was funded to provide daily reports of the Arusha War Crimes Tribunal proceedings in Kinyarwanda for broadcast throughout **Rwanda**, parts of Eastern Zaire and Burundi. A secondary goal was to maintain visibility in the international press (e.g., VOA, Deutsche Welle, BBC, etc.) and exert pressure on the international community to arrest and bring to justice indicted war criminals. Despite a strong start, the impact of this activity has been minimal because of continuing problems with irregular Tribunal processes and changing perspectives on international NGOs (including OTI's grantee) by the Government of Rwanda.

D. Performance of the IR-3: Improved targeting of OTI interventions --

IR-3 is new and seeks to measure the overall trend, pattern, and results of OTI's activities based on OTI's internal program management processes. Therefore, this IR attempts to consolidate OTI's management practices by monitoring program activities. **In all active countries, OTI continuously assessed, and recalibrated its program targets and intervention strategies, when necessary.**

Table 6: Summary of IR-3

IR-3: Improved targeting of OTI interventions	ANG	FMRYU	GUA	LIB	RWA
Vulnerable and/or special groups and/or institutions identified and (re)targeted based on continuous assessment of outcomes	No need to retarget	Yes	No need to retarget	No need to retarget	Minimal focus
Redefinition of Intervention strategy based on continuous assessment of outcomes.	No	Yes	No need to redefine	No need to redefine	No need to redefine

ANALYSIS:

Indicator: Vulnerable and/or special groups and/or institutions identified and (re)targeted based on continuous assessment of outcomes --

In two of the five countries with active OTI programs, OTI was required to retarget groups and/or institutions based on continuous assessments of outcomes.

* In **Rwanda**, where a small program has focused on reporting on the Arusha Tribunal, OTI had to retarget its activity's institutional linkages with the Government of Rwanda. After only a few months of activity, the Government of Rwanda changed the "rules of the game" and refused to replay the summaries of the trial proceedings given to them as agreed. Moreover, the Tribunal itself did not proceed as quickly as expected, and OTI had to retarget its activities in order to be responsive to the UN's progress in processing war criminals.

* In the **Former Yugoslavia**, OTI refined its focus to target more active civil society groups in order to augment positive impacts. Over time, OTI found that some civil society groups, even when they "talked the talk" did not have an interest in reaching large parts of the population. These mostly elitist groups were more interested in reaching individuals and groups who were already fairly articulate about their support for democratic and peace processes. OTI's strategy to change attitudes and behaviors required a shift from some civil society groups to other more active and broad-based civil society groups.

* In **Angola, Guatemala**, and in **Liberia** there was no need to retarget, even when impacts were not as great as expected, because the target populations were appropriately determined during the design phase. This indicates that other factors

contribute to OTI's impact or lack thereof, such as changing security situations, insufficient political will, and underestimations of the time needed for discernable impact. Also, OTI's programs are often tied to implementation of peace accords, and thus impact is sometimes secondary to continued commitment to the peace process by the international community.

Indicator: Redefinition of Intervention strategy based on continuous assessment of outcomes --

In only one of the five countries with active OTI programs, OTI has redefined its strategy based on constant monitoring and assessment of the impact of our program activities. However, in 1997 OTI country programs in Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka were suspended as a result of reassessing OTI's strategies.

* In the **Former Yugoslavia**, OTI decided to develop a regional strategy instead of focussing on piecemeal activities in Bosnia. In particular, since serb populations in Bosnia listened to political voices in Serbia, and croatian populations in Bosnia were influenced by political voices in Croatia, OTI decided that in order to increase positive impacts of transition assistance in Bosnia, reformist and/or moderate voices in Serbia and Croatia had to be identified and supported. Thus, OTI's strategy shifted from a single country focus on Bosnia to a regional focus that includes Serbia-Montenegro and Croatia.

* Although we are not reporting on results from OTI-funded activities in **Sierra Leone** and **Sri Lanka** (for the reasons cited above in Part II, Section A), it is still relevant to discuss these programs in the analysis of this indicator. In both Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, downward spiraling security conditions required OTI to place programs on hold, and to reevaluate our strategies.

2. EXPECTED PROGRESS THROUGH FY 2000 AND MANAGEMENT ACTIONS

OTI will continue to assess and refine its monitoring and measurement activities throughout FY 1999 and FY 2000. In particular, OTI will focus on generating field-based indicators and measurements, in order to increase the relevancy of its performance measurement endeavors.

OTI will not establish targets as the office believes it is impossible to set reliable and relevant targets in the chaotic conditions of transitions and given the fluidity of transition assistance. However, in order to maximize performance, OTI will continue to incorporate lessons learned and program results (many articulated earlier in this document in the overview and factors affecting program performance section) from FY 1997 to date.

4. INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLANS

OTI was involved in two Integrated Strategic Plans (ISPs) in FY 1997, namely the Rwandan and Angolan ISPs. In addition to reviewing strategic plans and discussing related matters with Mission and Bureau staffs during last year's R4 processes, OTI continued those discussions throughout 1997. Many of the lessons learned and other issues associated with the ISP processes have been discussed in this document.

5. PERFORMANCE DATA TABLES

TABLE 7: MATRIX OF COUNTRY RESULTS

INDICATOR	ANG	Fr-Yug	CON	GUA	LIB	PHIL	RWA	S.L.	SRI
SO-1: Transitions successfully advanced in priority, conflict-prone countries			Not yet			Not yet		On hold	On hold
Progress toward establishment of a participatory governance	Yes	Yes		Not a focus	Not yet		Yes		
Progress toward establishment and equitable application of rule of law	Not a focus	Not a focus		Not a focus	Not a focus		Yes		
Progress towards civilian control over security.	Not yet	Not a focus		Yes	Yes		Not a focus		
Progress towards sustainable development	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Not yet		
IR-1: Enhanced citizen security									
Reintegration of ex-combatants	Insufficient	Not a focus		Yes	Partial		Not a focus		
Progress toward freedom of movement	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes		
Number of returned IDPs/refugees to their communities	Yes	Yes		Minimal	Minimal		Maybe		
IR-2: Democratic political processes initiated, reestablished, or expanded (pre-democracy building)									
Progress toward political and economic power sharing	Yes	Yes		Not sure	No		Yes		
Capacity of local and national governments to work together	Minimal	No		Not a focus	Yes		Yes		

INDICATOR	ANG	Fr-Yug	CON	GUA	LIB	PHIL	RWA	S.L.	SRI
Progress made toward the institutionalization of government and private-sector services.	GOA not responsive	Not a focus		Min. focus	Minimal		Yes		
Progress toward freedom of speech and alternative voices	Yes	Yes		Min focus	Yes		Minimal		
IR-3: Improved targeting of OTI interventions									
Vulnerable and/or special groups identified and (re)targeted based on continuous assessment of outcomes	No need	Yes		No need	No need		Min. Focus		
Recalibration of Intervention strategy based on continuous assessment of outcomes.	No	Yes		No need	No need		No need	Y	Yes

6. ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE (22 CFR 216 -- IEES AND EAS)

Not applicable to OTI activities.

PART III: MANAGEMENT CONTRACT

1. STATUS OF MANAGEMENT CONTRACT --

Throughout this report on FY 1997 results, OTI has proposed an additional intermediate result and refinements in indicators in the management contract for OTI's assistance. Throughout FY 1997, OTI has increased its knowledge of transitions and has worked closely with the Bureau's contractors to refine its understanding of performance measurement -- both of which justify such changes.

In addition to changing and refining OTI's management contract, OTI will continue to attempt to adopt performance measurement criteria for its activities (including our efforts to monitor and evaluate such activities.)

Changes to OTI's Management Contract:

Table 8: Changes to OTI's Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results

Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Performance Indicators	
	Original	Proposed
SO-1: Political transitions successfully advanced in priority, post conflict countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none">* Timeliness of intervention* Catalytic role of OTI* OTI's hand-off (exit) strategy* Success in avoiding dependency of countries on relief assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">* Progress toward establishment of a participatory governance* Progress toward establishment and equitable application of rule of law* Progress towards civilian control over security.* Progress towards sustainable development

	Performance Indicators	
IR-1: Enhance citizen security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Reduction in the number and availability of weapons of war; reduce numbers of weapons-related accidents/deaths * Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants back into society * Providing reliable information/news and expanding freedom of the press * Promoting the protection and knowledge of human rights standards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Reintegration of ex-combatants * Progress toward freedom of movement * Number of returned IDPs/refugees to their communities
<p>Original IR-2:</p> <p>Democratic political processes initiated, reestablished, or expanded through a local participatory decision-making process</p> <p>Proposed IR-2:</p> <p>Democratic political processes initiated, reestablished, or expanded (pre-democracy building)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Did OTI initiate programs to restore or support the creation of legitimate government at various levels? * Have communities participated in collaborative problem solving activities? * Have OTI programs encouraged the reemergence or creation of NGOs and civil society? * Has OTI encouraged the dissemination of reliable news/information (or other relevant transitional democracy topics such as conflict resolution methods) and freedom of the press? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Progress toward political and economic power sharing * Capacity of local and national governments to work together * Progress made toward the institutionalization of government and private-sector services. * Progress toward freedom of speech and alternative voices
<p>Proposed IR-3:</p> <p>Improved targeting of OTI interventions</p>	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Vulnerable and/or special groups identified and (re)targeted based on continuous assessment of outcomes * Recalibration of Intervention strategy based on continuous assessment of outcomes.

For this R4, OTI reviewed its programs and discussed with performance measurement experts how indicators were used to measure FY 1997 activities. OTI's proposed changes to our Management Contract are aggregated in the table above. While there is no change to the SO, OTI has proposed some new indicators for measuring progress. It formulated these changes on the assumptions donors and experts have suggested as criteria for successful transitions.

The original IR-2 limited democratic processes to the local level. Although this is an integral part of OTI's focus, it fails to include any activities centered at the national or regional levels. The proposed IR-2 moves local participatory decision-making to the indicator level.

OTI proposes the addition of a new Intermediate Result. This IR-3 moves the activities and indicators of success included in the FY 1996 SO-1 to a new IR. Much of the success of OTI's activities -- impact and results -- depends on the processes of OTI's assistance. It seems, moreover, that such processes (e.g., leveraging, timeliness, catalytic role, and hand-off strategies) are embraced by this proposed IR and related measurement of OTI's ability to recalibrate activities and redefine strategies.

Other Issues:

Throughout 1997, OTI continued to explore the relevance of new monitoring systems -- for (a) initiating new country programs, (b) monitoring intervention opportunities for relevant countries, and (c) assessing the impact of its interventions.

(a) OTI's New Country Selection Strategy: OTI used the New Country Selection Strategy framework proposed in the FY 1996 R4 to develop relevant and responsive strategies for intervening in new countries, and to assess the relevance of OTI activities for country programs suggested by other actors in the U.S. Government. The framework established last year included four main stages for new country initiatives: 1) identify vulnerable countries; 2) conduct Washington-based assessments of potential countries as identified in step 1, and determine whether the countries meet OTI's country selection criteria; 3) conduct field assessments in selected countries; and 4) initiate new OTI country programs, if relevant.

(b) Real-time monitoring system for countries that meet almost all of the selection criteria. Throughout 1997, OTI collaborated with other offices within BHR, and with the Africa Bureau and the Policy Bureau in determining the relevance of a real-time monitoring system. Discussions continue into FY 1998, as the relevance to USAID programming and activities is debated.

(c) Real-time monitoring may enable OTI to establish baseline data for crisis countries, in order to improve measurement of results for those countries where it initiates interventions. As above, the debate continues within the Agency as to the relevance and capacity of such monitoring systems.

2. ANTICIPATED NEEDS

See PART III, Section 1.

PART IV: RESOURCES REQUEST

1. FINANCIAL PLAN

As OTI has only one Strategic Objective, estimates of the level of resources required to achieve the results agreed to in the management contract are not distinguished by other SOs and/or IRs. OTI's program resources required for FY 1998, FY 1999, and FY 2000 are reflected in the table below.

Table x: OTI Budget Summary (target and request)*

	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999 (target)	FY 1999 (request)	FY 2000 (target)	FY 2000 (request)
TOTAL	\$25 M	\$30 M	\$45 M	\$45 M	\$65 M	\$65 M

* Pipeline is taken into consideration in estimating resource needs for FY 1998 - 2000. OTI has programmed its resources in accordance with the Agency's forward funding guidance.

OTI's request and target for FY 2000 assumes the following:

*** The total number of countries in transition will not change much over the next few years** (approximately 50 countries are experiencing some sort of transition). As stated in OTI's 1999 R4, most of the experts contacted by OTI suggest that while the overall numbers of complex emergencies will probably not increase over the next 5-10 years, the intensity of the political disasters and strategic importance of the countries may well increase. Thus, as some countries graduate out of the emergency transition phase (perhaps two to three will graduate each year) the countries entering transition phases appropriate to OTI's activities will increase in the next couple of years.

*** Demand for OTI activities and programs in existing transition countries will continue to grow.** Collaboration and support from USAID Missions for OTI-type interventions are expanding. In addition, the NSC, State Department, and Ambassadors and their staffs view the OTI approach to advance political stability as the highest priority assistance.

Because of this, in FY 1997 OTI was requested to respond to "new" complex emergencies including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tajikistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Albania (OTI decided that its intervention criteria were not met in Tajikistan and Albania). In FY 1998 OTI has already been requested to respond to "new" complex emergencies in Northern Ireland, the West Bank/Gaza, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and the Sudan -- to name but a few.

*** The USAID Budget Submission for FY 1999 which reflects an increase in IDA, will be approved by the U.S. Congress.** As stated in the request, this increase includes \$15 million over the \$190 million total IDA level in FY 1997 and FY 1998. The FY 1999 USAID request "includes approximately \$45 million for innovative, post-crisis transition initiatives. The OTI program is being expanded from the FY 1998 level of \$30 million and the FY 1997 level of \$25 million." (USAID, CP Presentation, FY99)

*** OTI will continue to provide increasing amounts of technical assistance to USAID Missions and other donors.** This TA will leverage non-OTI resources to operate transition activities.

*** OTI's direct use of non-IDA funding (i.e., resources transferred to OTI from other Bureaus or from the State Department) for transitional programming will likely continue to decrease, as it did in FY 1997.** This occurred for a variety of reasons, including reductions in USAID's DA budget in 1997 and in 1998. Because of the uncertain nature of funding for USAID, OTI can not depend on these other funds for future resources. Thus, OTI will need additional IDA funding in order to implement its transitional programs in FY 2000.

The total estimate for both the target and request for FY 2000 comes to approximately \$65 Million. The request for FY 2000 is based on the following:

OTI intends to concentrate on 8 to 10 countries in transition, while supporting certain regional priorities (eg, the Greater Horn of Africa, the Caucasus region).

OTI will be engaged in 3-4 large transitional programs (at approximately \$8-15 million each)

OTI will be engaged in 2-3 medium transitional program (at approximately \$3-6 million each)

OTI will be engaged in 3 small transitional programs (at approximately \$1-3 million each)

OTI will be providing increasing amounts of technical assistance to USAID Missions and other donors

OTI will fund small pilot projects to test innovative activities for regional and/or global application.

2. PRIORITIZATION OF OBJECTIVES

With only one Strategic Objective, and because OTI's mandate requires it to remain flexible in order to respond to targets of opportunity when and where they open up, OTI would choose to operate in fewer countries rather than eliminate activities under any of our Intermediate Results if our funding for FY 2000 is lower than expected.

3. LINKAGE WITH CENTRALLY FUNDED MECHANISMS

Not applicable to BHR.

4. WORKFORCE AND OPERATING EXPENSES

See attached files (WF-OTI1.WK4 and OTIOE1.WK4).

Workforce

Org. BHR/OTI FY 1998 On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	7							7							0	7
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program	32							32							0	32
FSN/TCN Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire: OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	39	0	0	0	0	0	0	39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org. BHR/OTI FY 1999 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	8							8							0	8
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program	35							35							0	35
FSN/TCN Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org. BHR/OTI FY 1999 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	8							8							0	8
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program	35							35							0	35
FSN/TCN Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org. BHR/OTI FY 2000 Target On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	10							10							0	10
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program	45							45							0	45
FSN/TCN Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Org. BHR/OTI FY 2000 Request On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	10							10							0	10
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program	45							45							0	45
FSN/TCN Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org. BHR/OTI FY 2001 On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
U.S. Direct Hire	10							10							0	10
Other U.S. Citizens: 1/ OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program	45							45							0	45
FSN/TCN Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
FSN/TCN Non-Direct Hire:																
OE Internationally Recruited								0							0	0
OE Locally Recruited								0							0	0
Program								0							0	0
Total Staff Levels	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55
TAACS								0							0	0
Fellows								0							0	0

1/ Excluding TAACS and Fellows

Workforce

Org. BHR/OTI Summary On-Board Estimate	SO/SpO Staff							Total SO/SpO Staff	Management Staff						Total Mgmt.	Grand Total Staff
	SO 1	SO 2	SO 3	SO 4	SpO 1	SpO 2	SpO 3		Org. Mgmt.	Con- troller	AMS/ EXO	Con- tract	Legal	All Other		
FY 1998:																
U.S. Direct Hire	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
OE Internationally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staff	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Program Funded	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32
Total FY 1998	39	0	0	0	0	0	0	39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
FY 1999 Target:																
U.S. Direct Hire	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
OE Internationally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staff	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Program Funded	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	35
Total FY 1999 Target	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43
FY 1999 Request:																
U.S. Direct Hire	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
OE Internationally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staff	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Program Funded	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	35	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	35
Total FY 1999 Request	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43
FY 2000 Target:																
U.S. Direct Hire	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
OE Internationally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staff	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Program Funded	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	45
Total FY 2000 Target	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55
FY 2000 Request:																
U.S. Direct Hire	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
OE Internationally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staff	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Program Funded	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	45
Total FY 2000 Request	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55
FY 2001 Estimate:																
U.S. Direct Hire	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
OE Internationally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OE Locally Recruited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total OE Funded Staff	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Program Funded	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	45
Total FY 2000 Target	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55

Workforce

MISSION :

BHR: Office of Transition Initiatives

USDH STAFFING REQUIREMENTS BY SKILL CODE

BACKSTOP (BS)	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 98	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 99	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2000	NO. OF USDH EMPLOYEES IN BACKSTOP FY 2001
01SMG	1	1	1	1
02 Program Off.	3	3	4	4
03 EXO				
04 Controller				
05/06/07 Secretary	1	1	1	1
10 Agriculture.				
11Economics				
12 GDO	2	3	3	3
12 Democracy				
14 Rural Dev.				
15 Food for Peace				
21 Private Ent.				
25 Engineering				
40 Environ				
50 Health/Pop.				
60 Education				
75 Physical Sci.				
85 Legal				
92 Commodity Mgt				
93 Contract Mgt				
94 PDO				
95 IDI				
Other*			1	1
TOTAL	7	8	10	10

*PMI

BUREAU: BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
OFFICE: OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES

OC O.E. BUDGET BY RESOURCE CODES
Washington Offices & Bureaus Requests

Other Operational Travel

1998	1999	1999	2000	2000	
ACTUAL	TARGET	REQUEST	TARGET	REQUEST	
35.0	40.0	40.0	50.0	50.0	
20.0	25.0	25.0	30.0	30.0	
30.0	35.0	35.0	45.0	45.0	
85.0	100.0	100.0	125.0	125.0	
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
85.0	100.0	100.0	125.0	125.0	0.0

ANNEX 1: TRANSITION DEFINED

Abstract definition: Rapid (or marked or dramatic) change in political, economic, social, and/or other arenas, which institutions, communities, and/or individuals have difficulty accommodating.

Rationale: This definition is comprehensive: it includes the G/Democracy Center's concept of transitional democracy -- movement from authoritarian to more democratic governance; it includes OTI's use of the term -- transitioning to and out of political conflict; and it includes ENI's use of the term -- transitioning from communist to market economies.

Also, this definition embraces different kinds of changes -- from technical changes (eg, telecommunications), to environmental changes (eg, drought), to political change (eg, constitutional reform), to changes in personal security (eg, war).

Evidence: How to recognize a transition: there might be a rapid succession of transition manifestations, from mere tension to out-right confrontation; or there might be simultaneous transition indications, where tensions and violence exist at the same time in different parts of the country or in different sectors. The rapid escalation of violence might be the indicator that a political/security transition is underway. Likewise, progress towards cease-fires, negotiated settlements, and UN/US military intervention might also be an indicator that a transition is occurring.

Relevance to OTI: For OTI, a transition might be indicated by a significant increase or decrease in violence. Thus, a cease-fire might indicate the possibility of a movement towards peace. The violent takeover of a village by rebel troops might indicate the possibility of a devolution into war. Since peace and war are dynamic phenomena -- both could be occurring at the same time -- there is no classic transition model.

OTI has been using the term "window of opportunity" to describe the initiation of transition activities. Windows of opportunity seem to include the events of and progress towards cease-fires, negotiated settlements, and UN/US military intervention; windows of opportunity might also be changes in government, public statements, and more.

Applied Definition: A rapid change from relief operations to reconstruction and sustainable development operations.

Rationale: Donors have also been using the term transition to include the idea of linking relief activities to reconstruction and sustainable development programs. The transition concept here includes operational, budgetary, and staffing concerns. The transition from relief to development

operations is not linear, but can consist of relief activities and development assistance occurring at the same time.

Evidence: How to recognize a transition: a visible indicator of an ongoing transition is the simultaneous presence of relief and development activities. This can occur in a number of ways; through embedding links to development within relief activities -- food for work programs; supporting development activities while humanitarian assistance is in process -- reintegration of ex-combatants into society; and plans to hand-off selected relief activities to development operations.

Relevance to OTI: Operationally, OTI's mandate is to work in transitional situations -- it directly links relief activities to development programs, through political reconstruction (or construction) activities.

ANNEX 2a
REVIEW OF COUNTRY PROGRAM/ACTIVITIES FOR OTI'S FY97 R4 Report

Washington and Field Indicators per SO & IR	Angola <i>* data from interview with Marc Scott</i>	DROC <i>* activities initiated in late FY 97, thus not measurable results.</i>	Former Yugoslavia <i>* data from country reports and interview with David Costello</i>
SO-1: Transition successfully advanced in priority, conflict-prone countries.			
A. Citizen influence on national policy outcomes			<p>1. Dialogue in OTI sponsored meetings, debates, conferences, influenced agendas of political parties and some gov. policy.</p> <p>2. Thru grants to TV and radio stations and news agencies provided objective, alternative information which influenced government party agendas</p>

<p>B. Institutional mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts.</p>			<p>1. Supported ten community centers and public programs to promote tolerance and public policy discussions.</p> <p>2. Supported over 100 public debates and assemblies to provide a forum to discuss multi-ethnic issues.</p>
--	--	--	---

C. Objective information available	<p>VOA provided information on human rights on human rights violations, security, alleged attacks, and mine awareness. VOA has a listener ship of 59 percent.</p> <p>Had a “CNN effect” mobilizing the Troika commission to address the issue.</p>		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Prior to OTI support, there was no independent media in RS. OTI fostered the development of more objective and independent media by providing grants to 11 TV stations, 27 radio stations, 22 newspapers, to provide objective, alternative information. 2. Supported the establishment and/or expansion of 102 indigenous civil society groups to foster discussion of political and cultural issues. 3. Training and support to the above media outlets on how to provide alternative point of view.
------------------------------------	--	--	---

D. Institutional capacity of (new) governance	None		<p>1. Provided TA to the Commission on real estate property claims.</p> <p>2. Supported establishment and development of journalist Associations to promote freedom of the press and to enhance journalist capabilities.</p>
E. Structure for civilian reconciliation (eg, joint participation in rehab. activities that benefit both groups, market transactions, etc.)	<p>1. OTI-funded 588 distinct project activities thru local NGOs which reached 377 communities. Activities included rehabilitation of schools, clinics, markets, bridges, roads and some community buildings.</p> <p>2. In some regions, communities established markets on the border between UNITA and UNLPA territories which resulted in former enemies conducting commerce and trade with each other.</p>		<p>1. 61 conferences held with different ethnic groups on independent journalism, women's concerns, and issues related to refugees and displaced persons.</p> <p>2. Youth groups, women's groups, and groups for the handicapped and the blind established to provide forum for discussion.</p>

F. Incr. Participation in civil society	Thru the participatory projects conducted at the community level, civilians became more involved in decision making processes to resolve local problems.		<p>1. More participation in civil society thru organizational meetings, round table discussions, debates, assemblies, and conferences.</p> <p>2. Supported 208 civic society projects.</p>
G. Improved security situation	Broadcasts from VOA had security messages and reported on Mine Action activities.		

H. Proxy: targeting, timeliness, leverage, catalytic role, flexibility, hand-off policy			<p>1. Targeting: OTI refined its focus to target more “active” civil society groups.</p> <p>2. Targeting: OTI decided to develop a regional strategy instead of focussing on piece meal activities in Bosnia.</p> <p>3. OTI is continually assessing program activities in order to target those which give the highest return.</p> <p>4. Targeted minority groups in all of their activities.</p> <p>5. Leveraged program funding with EU, Soros Foundation, and ENI Bureau</p> <p>.</p>
IR-1: Enhanced citizens security	Angola	DROC	Former Yugoslavia

A. Establishment of equitable application of the rule of law along the democratic time line.	None		
B. Human Rights monitoring	None		
C. Removal of physical threat (e.g., demining, mine awareness, demobilization, disarming, etc.)	<p>1. Mine Action awareness campaigns reached 2 million people.</p> <p>2. 2,750 Angolans received training and were employed as deminers.</p> <p>3. Because roads and land were cleared of mines, relief and development activities have been able to take place and vaccination campaigns were made possible.</p> <p>4. Additionally, commerce opened up as roads were cleared, and there has been a better distribution of food, technical assistance and support.</p> <p>5. 10,000 ex-fighters demobilized and received literacy training. However, desertion rate over 50 percent.</p>		Grants for land mine awareness. Program supported by OTI visited by Princess Diana.

D. Media on security issues	VOA reported on mine awareness and security issues. OTI funded mine awareness communication activities such as, puppet shows, production of comic books, brochures and radio skits.		<p>1. Countered nationalist propaganda thru OTI-supported media outlets: 11 TV stations, 27 radio stations, 22 newspaper.</p> <p>2. Over three million alternative, independent newspapers and magazines with information that counters nationalist propaganda distributed.</p>
E. Participatory decision-making about restoring livelihoods (eg, livestock restocking, shelter, etc.)	CREA provided technical assistance to community-based projects where local citizens decided what they would like to do and mobilized resources to do it, e.g. a group of women decided to begin a small pineapple farm.		
F. Rehabilitation/livelihood restored	Thru Mine Action activities, IDPs, refugees, etc. returned to their communities because it was safe.		

G. Return of ex-combatants, IDPs, and refugees			Information available thru media outlets and support to returnee-based advocacy organizations contributed to the return of refugees.
IR-2: Democratic political processes initiated, reestablished or expanded.	Angola	DROC	Former Yugoslavia

<p>A. Availability of useful information and democratic content presented</p>	<p>1. VOA broadcast useful and objective information. Both opposing parties considered these broadcasts to be impartial.</p> <p>2. VOA reported on conflict resolution and reconciliation in Angola.</p> <p>3. When the GOA censored VOA, it picked up a local station, Radio 2000, and repackaged and rebroadcast it.</p>		<p>1. Support for the establishment and/or expansion of alternative, independent newspapers and magazines, radio stations, and newspapers resulted in a freer, more independent press.</p> <p>2. Useful and democratic content provided thru nearly 2,000 TV and radio broadcasts, 3,222,000 alternative, independent newspapers, 108,000 posters, 15 public announcements, and one million brochures.</p>
---	--	--	--

<p>B. Communities organizing to solve problems of common interest.</p>	<p>1. CREA goes into communities to ask what they want. Most communities want to rehabilitate schools. CREA provided the support for the materials, but the community had to provide labor and other resources and the government had to promise to provide a teacher.</p> <p>2..If the schools were successful, then communities generated income to help sustain the school.</p> <p>3. 19 micro enterprise organizations were set up.</p>		<p>Ten community impact projects.</p>
--	---	--	---------------------------------------

C. Recognition of the political role of local grassroots organizations and media (bottom up and top down)	Some community activities received recognition from the Ministry of Social Reinsertion.		<p>1. OTI supported TV and radio stations and newspapers and news agencies have been at the forefront in reporting on, and informing the public about the region's unfolding political developments.</p> <p>2. TV, radio, and newspapers with alternative view points ethnic tolerance played a significant role in setting the political agenda. For example, stories about government corruption, economic distress and lost opportunities were instrumental in laying the ground work for President Plavsic's recent rise, and her recent split with hard liners in Pale.</p>
D. Capacity of “active” civic/social organizations			Support to 96 NGOs and 208 civic society projects increased capacity of local NGO and civic organizations

E. Establishment of rule of law			Grants to legal aid societies to provide direct assistance to clients on legal and human rights issues.
F. Degree of access to resources by all citizens: political, economic, etc.	<p>1. Farmers increased production.</p> <p>2. 16 out of 19 micro enterprise activities produced products and profit.</p> <p>3. UNITA ensured freedom of movement for community-level activities.</p>		
G. Government involvement in problem solving (related to transition)			

ANNEX 2b
REVIEW OF COUNTRY PROGRAM/ACTIVITIES FOR OTI'S FY97 R4 Report

Washington and Field Indicators per SO & IR	Guatemala <i>* Per country reports</i>	Liberia <i>* Per country reports and interview with Silvia Fletcher</i>	Philippines <i>* Per country reports and interview with Chris O'Donnell</i> <i>* Activities initiated at the end of FY97, thus no measurable results.</i>
SO-1: Transition successfully advanced in priority, conflict-prone countries			
A. Citizen influence on national policy outcomes		USAID, Embassy, international donors and local civic orgs. convinced GOL to reopen STAR radio station.	
B. Institutional mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts.	Decreased military staff by one-third		

C. Objective information available		<p>1. Creation of Starr radio to provide objective information. It has become a respected impartial source of information about Liberia.</p> <p>2. TDS show provided informative information about elections to keep rural election officials and general populous informed about election process.</p>	
D. Institutional capacity of (new) government	Political will strengthened through OTI activities; GOG met rebel demands		
E. Structure for civilian reconciliation (eg, joint participation in rehab. activities that benefit both groups, market transactions, etc.)			
F. Incr. Participation in civil society	1. Assistance to URNG enabled all but 400 ex-combatants to incorporate successfully into Guatemalan civil society.	10,000 demobilized fighters given jobs.	

<p>G. Improved security situation</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Few ex-combatants have been implicated in criminal activities 2. Zero percent of the ex-combatants involved in OTI vocational training programs have been implicated in criminal activities. 2. No public reaction to ex-combatants; few threats made against them. 3. Housing 400 “hard core” ex-combatants until GOG Land Fund can provide new homes. 	<p>10,000 demobilized fighters given jobs in public sector.</p>	
---------------------------------------	---	---	--

H. Proxy: targeting, timeliness, leverage, catalytic role, flexibility, hand-off policy	<p>1. OTI represented at the Special Commission for Incorporation (CEI).</p> <p>2. Hosted seminar for CEI to provide forum for incorporation after the demobilization phase.</p> <p>3. Partnered with UNDP and EU to construct eight demobilization camps.</p> <p>4. Leveraged coordination and cost-sharing for demobilization activities with UNDP, EU and GOG resulting in OTI only providing 16-20% of the total costs.</p> <p>5. Exit (hand-off) strategy in place.</p>		<p>1. Timeliness: delivery of seeds and fertilizer and training within 75 days of decision to go in the country.</p> <p>2. Targeted rebel combatants as recipients of seeds, tools, training, etc. to help promote security situation.</p> <p>3. Leveraged funding for Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAB).</p>
IR-1: Enhanced citizens security	Guatemala	Liberia	Philippines
A. Establishment of equitable application of the rule of law along the democratic time line.			
B. Human Rights monitoring			

C. Removal of physical threat (e.g., demining, mine awareness, demobilization, disarming, etc.)	1. Demobilization of 2,940 ex-combatants. 2. Demobilization of 1722 military police	10,000 demobilized fighters given jobs.	171 combatants have planted.
D. Media on security issues		1. Starr Radio 2. TDS show on radio station	
E. Participatory decision-making about restoring livelihoods (eg, livestock restocking, shelter, etc.)			

F. Rehabilitation/livelihood restored	<p>1. Health care services strengthened in order to treat ex-combatants.</p> <p>2. Funded vocational training provided for ex-combatants.</p> <p>3. OTI funded 1,100 vocational training “scholarships” to ex-combatants</p> <p>4. Funded a project to provide 382 ex-combatants with self-sustaining, independent livelihoods</p> <p>5. Funded two vocational orientation seminars for military police.</p> <p>6. 400 ex-military registered for OTI-funded training and apprenticeship “re-tooling” projects.</p>	Streets cleaned, roads cleared, and schools and clinics refurbished by demobilized fighters.	171 rebel combatants have planted after having rec's seeds, tools and training.
G. Return of ex-combatants, IDPs, and refugees	Funded return of 218 URNG ex-combatants.		
IR-2: Democratic political processes initiated, reestablished or expanded.	Guatemala	Liberia	Philippines

A. Availability of useful information and democratic content presented	<p>1. All ex-combatants received civic education and vocational orientation.</p> <p>2. Funded a social communication campaign to raise awareness of the rights of ex-combatants incorporating into society.</p> <p>3. Funded a literacy program which reached 2,600 adults, of whom 15-20% were not ex-combatants.</p>	<p>1. STAR radio station</p> <p>2. TDS show on Liberian radio.</p>	
B. Communities organizing to solve problems of common interest.			
C. Recognition of the political role of local grassroots organizations and media (bottom up and top down)		Local civic orgs mobilized with donor community to force GOL to reopen STAR radio station.	
D. Capacity of “active” civic/social organizations		Same as above	
E. Establishment of rule of law			
F. Degree of access to resources by all citizens: political, economic, etc.			

<p>G. Government involvement in problem solving (related to transition)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. GOG funded one-third of the military demobilization. 2. GOG made sincere effort to support the peace process and accommodated URNG demands. 		
---	---	--	--

ANNEX 2c
REVIEW OF COUNTRY PROGRAM/ACTIVITIES FOR OTI'S FY97 R4 Report

Washington and Field Indicators per SO & IR	Rwanda <i>* data from country reports and interview with heather Mchugh</i>	Sierra Leone <i>* activities placed on hold due to changes in the security situation</i>	Sri Lanka <i>* activities placed on hold due to changes in the security situation</i>
SO-1: Transition successfully advanced in priority conflict prone countries			
A. Citizen influence on national policy outcomes			
B. Institutional mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts.			
C. Objective information available			
D. Institutional capacity of (new) government	<p>1. WIT involved Ministry of Gender in project management.</p> <p>2. TA to the Ministry of Interior to strengthen capacity for political decentralization, especially in 12 pilot communes targeted by Mission's local governance initiative.</p>		

E. Structure for civilian reconciliation (eg, joint participation in rehab. activities that benefit both groups, market transactions, etc.)	<p>1.Funded 302 projects which had groups working together in the community</p> <p>2. WIT projects brought different ethnic groups together to discuss and solve community problems.</p> <p>3. Workshops for 410 local leaders</p> <p>4. Peace groups (76) and village development committee formed.</p>		
F. Incr. Participation in civil society			
G. Improved security situation	To a certain degree, improved personal security by improved housing, salvaging crops by providing \$ for through seeds and tools		

<p>H. Proxy: targeting, timeliness, leverage, catalytic role, flexibility, hand-off policy</p>	<p>1. Targeting: funded 302 projects, approx. 37,625 beneficiaries- mostly women's groups</p> <p>2. Targeting: WIT targeted grants to critical needs identified by the community; most of its 40,572 beneficiaries are some of the most vulnerable groups.</p> <p>3. Calibration: WIT allowed for continuous feedback from the community, and targeted its grant allocations appropriately.</p> <p>4. Catalytic role in restoring confidence, peace and livelihoods</p> <p>5. Leveraged funding for decentralization with World Bank and UNDP</p> <p>.</p>		<p>Changing security environment causes re-evaluation of timing of OTI assistance.</p>
<p>IR-1: Enhanced citizens security</p>	<p>Rwanda</p>	<p>Sierra Leone</p>	<p>Sri Lanka</p>

A. Establishment of equitable application of the rule of law along the democratic time line.	1. TA to Ministry of Justice 2. Funding the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) & disseminating the proceedings via radio broadcasts		
B. Human Rights monitoring	Funding to UN High Commissions for Human Rights		
C. Removal of physical threat (e.g., demining, mine awareness, demobilization, disarming, etc.)			
D. Media on security issues			
E. Participatory decision-making about restoring livelihoods (eg, livestock restocking, shelter, etc.)	1. WIT grants supported projects (rehabilitation of community structures, provision of seeds, tools, etc) chosen by the community through participation in community groups and/or associations.		

F. Rehabilitation/livelihood restored	<p>1. WIT grants for seeds and tools helped save agricultural seasons for associations in several communes.</p> <p>2. WIT grants to 279 associations for livestock and seeds and tools to enable communities to restore livelihood (plant crops) which helped to keep peace.</p> <p>3. If activity is profitable, groups/associations repay the value of the grant; 75% of projects are repaying</p>		
G. Return/reintegration of ex-combatants, IDPs, and refugees	<p>1. WIT provided funding for construction of houses, 100% of which were occupied, which helped the reintegration of returnees.</p>		
IR-2: Democratic political processes initiated, reestablished or expanded.	Rwanda	Sierra Leone	Sri Lanka
A. Availability of useful information and democratic content presented		Weekly radio programs on women's issues, and the peace and reconciliation process	

B. Communities organizing to solve problems of common interest.	<p>1. WIT grants supported community activities to solve problems identified by community groups and/or association.</p> <p>2. Women participated in the decision making process in their communities.</p>		
C. Recognition of the political role of local grassroots organizations and media (bottom up and top down)	<p>1. Opposition leader and wife appointed to gov. political group.</p> <p>2. Election of representatives on community development committee and by local community members.</p>		
D. Capacity of “active” civic/social organizations	WIT grants has increased the democratic decision making within the community groups and associations.		
E. Establishment of rule of law			

F. Degree of access to resources by all citizens: political, economic, etc.	<p>1.WIT funded 362 income generating projects.</p> <p>2. WIT grants restarted depressed community economies and entrepreneurial activities.</p> <p>3. WIT grants increased opportunities for women to make decisions on what groups and activities to fund.</p>		By supporting the Jaffna Technical College through UNDP incorporates Tamils into education or vocational opportunities.
G. Government involvement in problem solving (related to transition)	<p>1. As co-funder of the WIT program, Ministry of Family, Gender and Social Affairs demonstrated concern to the population and responded to urgent and essential needs in rural areas.</p> <p>2. WIT has been key in providing the Ministry the means and tools to work with women in the community.</p>		